"I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves."

Thomas Jefferson

Comment to the Administrative Action
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
by Thomas J. Tremmel
March 17, 1999

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
and
Florida Department of Transportation
in cooperation with
U.S. Coast Guard

F.P. ID Number: 210255-1
State Project Number: 78040-1508
Work Program Number: 2116970
Federal Aid Project Number: BRF-491-2(14)
 
Bridge of Lions (S.R. A1A) over the Matanzas River
St. Augustine, St. Johns County, Florida

This Comment for the record is in response to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the St. Augustine Bridge of Lions and will primarily deal with barge and tanker traffic, cargo, and navigation in response to the statements and data brought forward in this Draft Environmental Impact Statement and made in public forums as a part of this process by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Secondly, this Comment will address the "No Adverse Effect" on the Area of Potential Effects of the St. Augustine Historic Districts.

Navigation and Commercial Traffic on the Intracoastal Waterway and at the Bridge of Lions

This section of the Comment cites the source documents used by the U.S. Coast Guard, as stated by Coast Guard and Florida Department of Transportation officials for the purpose of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, in public forums, and in releases to the media. These source documents are the "Freight Traffic and Trips and Drafts Tables" compiled and provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Navigation Data Center, Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center, and are included in the Appendixes of this document.

Part One: The Intracoastal Waterway/Jacksonville to Miami

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (the Draft) often refers to the 349 mile segment from Jacksonville to Miami of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway in citing numbers of cargo tonnage. The Bridge of Lions is in the northern 50 miles of this segment of the Waterway. The Draft statements distinctly implies that all the cargo tonnages moving along this 349 mile segment transit from Jacksonville to Miami (or vice versa) in a continuous line from one point to the other with all this cargo tonnage passing through the Bridge of Lions.

This is not the case. The numbers tracked on this segment include many short trips, especially throughout South Florida, a heavily populated area and more active in the Waterway than the stretch through the Bridge of Lions. Throughout the Waterway, cargo moves from one point to another (ie. Miami to Ft. Lauderdale). These numbers are tracked for all traffic from port to port, inlets to ports, tributaries, and even intraportal--the movement of goods from Dock A to Dock B within the same port (See Appendix C for explanations and terminology).

In no way does all this cargo pass through the Bridge of Lions. In fact, a very small percentage passes through this Bridge. How much cargo passes through the Bridge of Lions, and how much of it is petroleum will be addressed in Parts 2 and 3 of this Comment. The purpose of Part 1 is to analyze the statements made in the Draft in reference to the entire 349 mile segment of the Jacksonville to Miami Intracoastal Waterway.

In Exhibit J, Paragraph 3 of the Draft, U.S. Coast Guard Correspondence dated December 29, 1997, to Mr. David Byrd of the Florida Department of Transportation from John W. Winslow, Chief, Bridge Section, Mr. Winslow makes the statement that "Available records indicate there has been a 400% increase in cargo tonnage in the last 8 years with a high percentage of the transits between Jacksonville and Miami involving fuel oils." This statement would be true for the 8 years which start in 1987 and end in 1994. These years show a 430% increase comparatively (see Fig. 1-6 of Page 1-18 of the Draft and Appendix A of this Comment--Trips and Drafts Tables), but this is not at all true for the "last 8 years" of available data at the time this correspondence is dated.

At the time Mr. Winslow's correspondence was dated, two more years of data were available (1995 and 1996), neither of which is cited in his correspondence nor in the Draft. Since the time his correspondence was written and a year before the Draft was published, the 1997 data became available, but is also not included in this Draft. All 3 years of data were available well before the release of the Draft in January of 1999. With the addition of these 3 years of new data, many more accurate and applicable statements may be made about the cargo tonnage moving in, out, up, down, and through this 349 mile segment of the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami (See Appendix A or Fig. 1-6A).

Figure 1-6A
Same table and source as figure 1-6, Page 1-18 of Draft EIS and Page 3 of this comment with the additions of 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers
Navigation Data Center
Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center
“Freight Traffic and Trips and Drafts Tables for Intracostal Waterway, Jacksonville to Miami”
Tons all traffic (x1000

Year	Tonnage
1985	209
1986	323
1987	186
1988	614
1989	537
1990	817
1991	713
1992	765
1993	1,029
1994	1,132
1995	435
1996	585
1997	424
1998	N/A

Using the 8 years beginning in 1988 and ending in 1995 available records indicate there has been a 26% increase in cargo tonnage in the last 8 years of transits on the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami.

Using the 8 years beginning in 1989 and ending in 1996 available records indicate there has been a 46% increase in cargo tonnage in the last 8 years of transits on the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami.

The most current statement using the Draft's methodology of comparison would be for the last 8 years beginning in 1990 and ending in 1997 where available records indicate there has been an <13% decrease> in cargo tonnage in the last 8 years of transits on the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami.

Page 1-16, Paragraph 2, under Ship Traffic in the Draft states that "By 1994, that volume (cargo tonnage) had increased to 1.1 million as shown in Fig. 1-6" between Jacksonville and Miami.

While this is a true statement, available records indicate that since the peak year of cargo tonnage, in 1994, when 1.1 million cargo tons transited on the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami, cargo tonnage has decreased to the end of 1997 by <57.5%>. (See Appendix A or Fig 1-6A).

Available records indicate that by 1997, the volume of cargo tonnage for transits on the Intracoastal Waterway between Jacksonville and Miami has decreased to 424 thousand cargo tons from a peak of cargo tonnage in 1994 of 1.1 million cargo tons. (See Appendix A or Fig 1-6A).

In summary of Part 1, some of the statements made and quoted above from the Draft by the Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard are simplistic, outdated, and selective.

For calculations of how Part 1 Comment statements were arrived at see Appendix A--Cargo Tonnage Calculation Sheet.

Part Two: "Passed the Point" of the Bridge of Lions

Since 1990, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have tracked and compiled Freight Traffic and Trips and Drafts Tables for "Passed the Point" of the Bridge of Lions which is at mile marker 469.0 of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway. This set of tables tracks the types and quantity of commercial vessels, what kind of commodities move through the Bridge, and the cargo tonnages of these commodities. This Comment will use "barge/tanker" synonymously for tracking commodities as both types of vessels often serve the same functions. Also, it is not possible to tell from these tables what a particular vessel is carrying (ie. petroleum or other liquid cargo), but these individual commodities are broken down by tonnage per vessel.

These "Passed the Point" tables act as a companion to the larger picture of the entire segment of Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami analyzed in Part One of this Comment. Since cargoes move in, out, up, and down the Intracoastal Waterway, this second set of data tables provides a specific look at what cargoes actually pass through a certain point; in this case, the Bridge of Lions. (See Appendix B).

It is unclear if the Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard used this companion set of tables to arrive at statements made in the Draft. If these tables were used, the information brought forward in the Draft is, at best, highly inaccurate and misstated.

On Page 3-12, paragraph 3 of the Draft under the heading Navigation, the following statement is made: "In 1996, approximately 1.1 million tons of cargo passed through the Bridge of Lions."

This statement is a gross inaccuracy. In 1996, 585,000 tons moved through the entire Jacksonville to Miami segment of the Intracoastal Waterway (See Appendix A--1996 and Fig. 1-6A, P. 4 of this Comment). In 1996, 29,000 tons of cargo moved through the Bridge of Lions (See Appendix B--1996 and Fig. 1-6B). The Draft statement cited above is overstated by 1,071,000 cargo tons or 97.4%. The only place that 1.1 million cargo tons appears in the Trips and Drafts Tables is for total cargo tonnage Jacksonville to Miami in the peak year of tonnage in 1994 (See Appendix A--1994 and Fig. 1-6, Page 1-18 of the Draft).

A complete picture of how much cargo tonnage has passed through the Bridge of Lions since "Passed the Point" records were included in the Trips and Drafts Tables beginning in 1990, in comparison to how much cargo tonnage has moved through the entire Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami since 1990 is included in Fig. 1-6B.

Figure 1-6B
Same table and source as figure 1-6, Page 1-18 of Draft EIS and Page 3 of this comment with the additions of 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers
Navigation Data Center
Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center
“Freight Traffic and Trips and Drafts Tables for Intracostal Waterway, Jacksonville to Miami”
Compared to “Passed the Point” of mile marker 469.0/Bridge of Lions
Tons all traffic (x1000

In comparing this data for the entire 8 year period (1990-1997), available records indicate the total amount of cargo tonnage that passed through the Bridge of Lions is less than 5% of the total cargo tonnage that passed through the Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami for the years of 1990 to 1997.

For the most current year of available data, 1997, 9,000 tons of cargo passed through the Bridge of Lions, or 2.1% of the total cargo tonnage that passed through the Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami that year. This was the least amount of cargo tonnage passing through the Bridge of Lions since "Passed the Point" data became available in 1990.

Page 1-16, paragraph 2 of the Draft states that "The traffic passing through the bridge has leveled off at 10,000 vessels a year. Of these vessels, approximately 400 are commercial barges, and approximately 700 are fishing trawlers." The balance of the 10,000 are recreational boats. According to a Florida Department of Transportation official, these numbers were arrived at by Bridge Tenders at the Bridge of Lions counting all the vessels passing through the Bridge for a nine month period in 1996. This Comment will not question the 700 fishing trawlers as there are at least two working trawlers based in St. Augustine that make the trip through the Bridge twice a day when working.

The statement in the Draft citing "approximately 400 are commercial barges" regarding the leveling off of traffic is contradictory to the 8 year average of 110 commercial barges/tankers. As demonstrated through the official regulatory records, the current leveling point of 1997 shows 37 barges/tankers combined through the Bridge according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' official "Passed the Point" Trips and Drafts Tables (Appendix B).

From 1995-1997, available records indicate an average of one barge/tanker passed through the Bridge of Lions every 4 days. In 1997, an average of one barge/tanker passed through the Bridge every 10 days.

In summary of Part 2, some of the statements made and quoted above from the Draft by the Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard are fallacious, inaccurate, misleading, and hyperbolic .

For calculations of how Part 2 Comment statements were arrived at see Appendix B, Cargo Tonnage and Barge and Tanker Count Calculation Sheet.

Part Three: Petroleum

In Exhibit J of the Draft U.S. Coast Guard Correspondence dated December 29, 1997, to Mr. David Byrd of the Florida Department of Transportation from John W. Winslow, Chief, Bridge Section, Mr. Winslow makes the statement that "Available records indicate there has been a 400% increase in cargo tonnage in the last 8 years with a high percentage of the transits between Jacksonville and Miami involving fuel oils." The Draft supports Mr. Winslow's statement in relation to petroleum based products (Page 3-12, paragraph 3) of the Draft under the heading Navigation where the following statement is made: "Petroleum products account for 85% of the total tonnage shipped along the Intracoastal Waterway."

This statement is true when considering the entire Jacksonville to Miami segment of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway, but it misrepresents the context of the passage of petroleum through the Bridge of Lions. Available records indicate that for the last 8 years of available data from 1990-1997, 91% of cargo tonnage transited in, out, and through the Jacksonville to Miami segment of the Waterway was petroleum related (See Appendix A or Fig. 1-6C). This statement does not apply to the "Passed the Point" companion tables for the Bridge of Lions. From 1990-1997, available records indicate that 36.4% of the total cargo tonnage which passed through the Bridge was petroleum related commodities. In this period, 64,000 of the 8 year total of 107,000 cargo tons passed through the Bridge in one year--1992 (See Appendix B or Fig. 1-6C). Available records demonstrate that in 1996 and 1997, no petroleum cargo tonnage passed through the Bridge of Lions (See Appendix B or Fig. 1-6C).

Figure 1-6C
Same table and source as figure 1-6, Page 1-18 of Draft EIS and Page 3 of this comment with the additions of 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers
Navigation Data Center
Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center
“Freight Traffic and Trips and Drafts Tables for Intracostal Waterway, Jacksonville to Miami”
Compared to “Passed the Point” of mile marker 469.0/Bridge of Lions
Tons all traffic (x1000

Figure 1-6C(Detail)

On December 15, 1997, The Junior Service League of St. Augustine, Inc. presented "A Public Awareness Forum about The Bridge of Lions" so the community could "Become better informed on the crucial issues that will impact you and your family." At this forum, John Winslow, Chief, Bridge Section of the Seventh Coast Guard Division made the statement that "85 percent of the barges that push through (the Bridge of Lions) carry fuel oil." As available records indicate, this statement is unbased, extremely erroneous and misleading.

Mr. Winslow further stated "that many of the barges bring fuel oil and supplies to Florida Power and Light, which supplies electricity to St. Johns County. If there were a decrease in size (of the barges), there would be more smaller barges." The reference to Florida Power and Light is not true and has no basis according to a Florida Power and Light official. The corporation has never transited any petroleum products through the Bridge of Lions, nor does it have any plans to. (See FPL correspondence in Appendix D).

These egregious misstatements are further quoted in the St. Augustine Record in Diane Rodgers article "Debate on Bridge Continues" published December 22, 1997 (Appendix D).

In summary of Part 3, the statements made and quoted above from the Draft by the Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard in relation to petroleum are true for the Jacksonville to Miami segment of the Intracoastal Waterway. However, gross misstatements have been made by the Florida Department of Transportation in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard in the Draft, and by representatives of these government agencies previous to the Draft's release in public hearings and other public forums about the high percentage of petroleum commodities passing the point of the Bridge of Lions. These manipulations of data have contributed to fear in many of the citizens of St. Augustine and surrounding areas of a high probability of an oil barge/tanker accident at the Bridge of Lions that would have a devastating affect on both the City of St. Augustine's economy and its environment.

For calculations of how Part 3 Comment statements were arrived at see Appendix B, Petroleum Comparative History of Appendix A and Appendix B with Calculations.

Part Four: Economic Impacts on Commercial Shipping Entities

In Exhibit J, Paragraph 4 of the Draft, U.S. Coast Guard Correspondence dated December 29th, 1997, to Mr. David Byrd of the Florida Department of Transportation from John W. Winslow, Chief, Bridge Section, Mr. Winslow makes the statement that "...delays, whether voluntary or mandated by Federal regulations, place serious economic impacts on a large number of small commercial entities."

This statement is supported in the Draft on Page 1-21, Paragraph 3 where it states "The COTP (Captain Of The Port) restrictions were removed and tows now voluntarily wait for slack water; however, these delays may have a substantial long term economic impact on a large number of small entities." This is reiterated on Page 4-16, Paragraph 1, where, in reference to the "mooring dolphins" for laying up until slack tide, the Draft states "This is considered a temporary solution since it may have an adverse economic impact on a substantial number of small business entities."

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers requires by legal authority (Section 11 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act 42 Stat. 1043 as amended and codified in 33 U.S.C. 555, under the penalty of law in the form of fines and imprisonment), the reporting by all vessel operators of record the Forms 3925 and 3925b (or equivalent) which provides a detailed data record of movement of vessels and commodities at the ports and harbors on the waterways and canals of the United States. The reports delineate individual vessel movements, and the completed point of loading and unloading of each individual commodity (See Appendix C of this Comment).

"The vessel and commodity movement information collected and compiled is designed to meet data requirements of the Department of the Army in connection with the duties assigned by Congress. These data also provide valuable information for other governmental departments, commercial shipping concerns and others interested in the U.S. transportation industry." (Appendix C of this Comment).

A list of the operators passed the point of milepoint 469.0 of the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway, the Bridge of Lions, is included in Appendix C for the years of 1990-1997. Over this eight year period, available records indicate that 22 commercial entities have passed the point. Of these 22 entities, 4 are commercial cruise lines of which only one is currently active through the Bridge. This cruise line transits two 40' wide vessels and docks at St. Augustine as a Port of Call. According to a company spokesperson, the Bridge is not a problem for the company navigationally, and is furthermore an economic asset to the company in connection with this Port of Call because of its historical significance.

Two of the commercial entities are "Fish Operators" whose smaller vessels daily transit the Bridge successfully. Two Commercial entities cannot be located from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' listings or from any other source and may be out of business. One entity that has passed the point of the Bridge in two of the last eight years has a fleet of at least 611 vessels and is not considered to be a small entity in this Comment. This leaves 13 small commercial entities passing the point of the Bridge over the eight year period that "may" be adversely economically impacted.

In discussing the economic impact of the horizontal clearance of this Bridge with the six most frequent users passing through the Bridge, two entities said that the current horizontal clearance had no economic impact on their business. This leaves 11 small commercial entities passing the point of the Bridge over the eight year period, though not all in any given year, that may be adversely economically impacted.

Of these 11 commercial entities, four entities contacted said that the horizontal clearance did at times have an economic impact on them because of delays, but all four of these entities said that it was only one point of a series of points along the Florida Intracoastal Waterway that slowed down their transits and that there were many points that combined to have an economic impact on their businesses. Some of the other points mentioned were shoals near Mantanzas Inlet, shoals at New Smyrna, where Haulover Canal meets the Intracoastal, and the bridge at Ft. Pierce. Each point has its own set of characteristics that range from shallow drafts to local conditions. Furthermore, all these commercial entities cited that the proliferation of recreational boats combined with a total lack of maintenance of the entire Florida Intracoastal Waterway over many years also contribute to the slowing down of transits. The remaining 7 entities were not contacted in the course of this Comment as available records indicate these entities infrequently passed the point of the Bridge.

In summary of Part 4, the statements that "a large number of small commercial entities" and "a substantial number of small business entities" should be corrected in the Draft to read some economic impacts on a small number of commercial entities, or an adverse economic impact on a limited number of small business entities.

Part Five: Ship Impacts at the Bridge of Lions

Ship impacts at the Bridge of Lions provide the only compelling argument brought forward by the Draft in relationship to widening the horizontal span of the Bridge in that they are a major safety issue. But once again, many of the statements brought forward by the Draft are overstated, simplistic, and selective toward a predetermined conclusion. The Draft does not explore the possibilities of there being any prudent or reasonable alternatives to address this safety issue while retaining the present horizontal opening, thus preserving the Bridge's national landmark status and historical value. One of the main purposes of a Draft Environmental Impact Statement under the guidelines set by the National Environmental Policy Act and the 106 Review process as a component of this Act, is to explore and bring forward all alternatives in an attempt to pragmatically resolve the issues that the Draft addresses.

On Page 1-19, Paragraph 1 of Ship Impacts, the Draft states that "The causes of these accidents vary from mechanical malfunctions with the drawspan to the navigational restrictions in the channel, especially the limited horizontal clearance between the bascule spans."

Mechanical malfunctions with the drawspan may be a characteristic of the Bridge's present maintenance and condition, but this has no relevance to the process that the Draft is addressing because it is stated in this Draft that this equipment will be replaced whether a Rehabilitation or Replacement Option is chosen.

Navigational restrictions in the channel such as "traffic obstructions" and "drifting anchors" also have no relevance to the limited horizontal clearance between the bascule spans. Furthermore, some of the accidents that have causes stated as "outrigger was left down, outrigger strike, bridge operator error, and wind power only through span" have to do with pilot/operator errors or errors in judgment. Two causes are listed as "tried to back out" and "turned hard right" which are nebulous, and four causes listed are "wind tide" or "local conditions." The other 17 "documented historic accident records (that) have been reviewed relating to vessels striking the Bridge of Lions" list cause as "not available" in the Draft for reasons not stated in the Draft (See Table 1-3, Page 1-19 in the Draft).

On Page 1-21, Paragraph 1 "A question raised at a public meeting held for the Bridge of Lions project concerned the contribution of operator error to the number of ship impacts." This question was not considered or addressed in the Draft, or the public meeting and is followed with this statement in the Draft: "The most thorough investigation of an accident took place on October 6, 1995 and can be found as Exhibit E in the Appendix. The investigator identified local conditions, age, and construction of the bridge as posing a significant hazard." Exhibit E should be corrected to read Exhibit F. On Page F-2, Paragraph 2 of this Exhibit is the following statement which is a part of the same investigation as cited above. "In his (the Master of the tug) interview with Coast Guard investigators, he indicated he normally works in Louisiana and has little first hand experience with the bridges in this section of the AICW. Nonetheless, he elected to approach and attempted to transit the Bridge of Lions despite limited local knowledge and against advice reasonably available to him in the U.S. Coast Guard Pilot...The Master of the tug Tred was issued a letter of warning by the officer in charge Marine Inspection Jacksonville on 6OCT95 for failing to prudently navigate his vessel through the Bridge of Lions, St. Augustine, Florida, on 7OCT95."

In the "Comments" part of this investigation, the Senior Investigating Officer recommends "actions to be taken to reduce the hazards posed by tug and tow combinations transiting the Bridge of Lions." Some of these recommendations were initiated and implemented with great success in that there have been no ship impacts since said implementations. The U.S. Coast Guard stated concerns in relation to safety in the Draft seem to be disingenuous with the actual policy in place as the current safety initiatives are voluntary rather than mandatory.

On Page 1-21, Paragraph 3 the Draft states "This initiative is intended to help reduce the number of bridge collisions, but is not considered by the Coast Guard to be an acceptable long term solution for transit through this reach of the Intracoastal Waterway." Throughout the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway, which includes three different Coast Guard Districts, there are many safeguards in place that are considered acceptable long term solutions to "restrictions" of the navigational channel. This Draft has isolated the Bridge of Lions and its accident history with no comparison to other bridges or restrictions of the channel along the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway that have similar traffic patterns.

In summary of Part 5, safety is of paramount importance when considering the options for the Bridge of Lions. The temporary solutions currently in place have worked well according to Coast Guard officials and commercial shipping concerns. If these solutions are combined with other suggested low cost pragmatic safety-related initiatives, they could become acceptable long term solutions for the present span clearance and would additionally reduce pilot/operator errors. Considering the declining amount of barge/tanker traffic and limited tonnage and the limited number of small entities that may be economically impacted transiting the Bridge of Lions, these solutions should at least be explored as long term solutions before a pragmatic decision is made as to the Rehabilitation or Replacement of the Bridge. The goal of the Draft is to explore all alternatives to attempt to resolve the conflicting Federal mandates involved. In consideration of possible solutions to the "navigational restriction" of the horizontal opening of the Bridge of Lions, this has not been achieved or even attempted. The absence of an exploration of solutions would itself appear to be serving the authors' intended outcome.

(For the purposes of this Comment, a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC 552 has been put forth for the review of records of all vessel impact data relating to the Bridge of Lions from 1982 through 1996--the last year since there has been an impact on the Bridge since prudent "temporary solutions" were implemented. This data has not been received as of the writing of the Comment. Due to time restraints of "The Comment Period" to this Draft Environmental Impact Statement, this data will be reserved for later analysis and comment if allowed by the laws that govern this process. If further comment cannot be considered, this information should be analyzed and included in any further revisions to the Environmental Impact Statement).

The Area of Potential Effects of the St. Augustine Historic Districts

Definition: Area of potential effects (APE)--"The geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may cause changes in the character or use of historic properties, if any such properties exist. This area always includes the actual site of the undertaking, and may also include other areas where the undertaking will cause changes in land use, traffic patterns, or other aspects that could affect historic properties" (National Historic Preservation Act/800.2 and Glossary of Terms).

On Page 4-5, Paragraph 3 in reference to alternatives 2A and 2B, the Draft states: "These two replacement options are not expected to have an adverse effect on the St. Augustine Historic District because the replacement bridge will retain two travel lanes and will be designed to reflect the visual atmosphere of the historic district." On Page 5-7, last Paragraph under the heading Replacement Options 2A and 2B is the statement "Because of the increased height and width, Replacement Options 2A and 2B will result in a change in view of the historic district from the bridge. The view of the bridge from this area will also be slightly different from that which exists today. A detailed discussion of these visual changes is found in Chapter 4. It was determined that Replacement Options 2A and 2B will not have an adverse effect on the St. Augustine Historic District;..."

The "detailed discussion" of the Visual Impacts/Aesthetics (Page 4-17 of the Draft) and the "visual changes" cited as having no adverse impact, in reference to Options 2A or 2B, lack systematic and accurate observation as well as a precise application of methodology. The methods used to arrive at the conclusion of "No Adverse Impact" visually and aesthetically to the Area of Potential Effects are unscientific and highly subjective. In that these Options admittedly "will result in a change in view of the historic district from the bridge," and vice versa, the lack of discipline of methodology in arriving at this Draft's conclusion have not fulfilled the National Environmental Policy Act/106 Review requirements and must be revisited.

Secondly, and more importantly, the National Environmental Policy Act/106 Review requires that the Draft address "other aspects" which include the positive or negative social and economic impacts to the Area of Potential Effects--the St. Augustine Historic Districts. The Draft is totally remiss in this regard.

Consideration must be given in this process to how the Rehabilitation or Replacement Options might effect St. Augustine's Historic Districts. If the Bridge of Lions is replaced, might St. Augustine lose a major part of its appeal as a historical destination and begin to suffer from perceived and actual loss to its continuum in America's history? Might this negative impact on tourism effect the entire City of St. Augustine which is dependent on its historic significance as its primary source of jobs and income? On the other hand, if this embattled Bridge survives this process and is restored or rehabilitated, it is highly probable that this will further enhance St. Augustine's stature as an important part of America's history and greatly benefit the city economically and historically.

The Draft has made repeated statements concerning the adverse economic impacts to the "small commercial entities" that transit the Intracoastal Waterway, but it has not addressed the "large or substantial" number of small commercial entities that may be affected in the Historic Districts and the entire City of St. Augustine. The possible adverse or beneficial impacts to small commercial shipping entities brought forward by the Draft should, at the least, be equally weighed against the possible adverse or beneficial impacts to the small commercial entities of the Historic Districts and the City of St. Augustine.

Additionally, there is a second historical district in the Area of Potential Effects that borders the St. Augustine Downtown Historic District and must also be considered socially and economically--The Lincolnville Historic District. Lincolnville is a 50 block designated historic neighborhood listed in the National Register of Historic Places which is a combination of low income and minority population that heavily depends on the economic base of the Downtown Historic District for jobs. As part of the National Environmental Policy Act, this historic district must also be considered in the possible adverse or beneficial impacts of the Area of Potential Effects of this Draft in relation to Executive Order 12898 "Environmental Justice" (See Appendix D).

Comment Summary

The Bridge of Lions, while an integral part of the City of St. Augustine, is part of the Federal Highway System and a National Historic Landmark that is funded by all U.S. taxpayers. Therefore, all Federal law and mandates must be considered and complied with in relation to the Rehabilitation or Replacement of this Bridge.

The National Historic Preservation Act is the law that calls for prudent and measured consideration for the preservation of this National Historic Landmark. Restoration or rehabilitation must be the "Decision of Record" in relation to the law unless there are no prudent or reasonable alternatives, or the benefits of the undertaking (replacement) justify accepting the loss of the historic property.

On the other hand, the U.S. Coast Guard, through its authority, recommends horizontal Guide Clearances for bridges over certain navigable waters of the United States. These guide clearances "are not intended to be regulatory in nature, but rather to identify minimum clearances which will normally receive favorable consideration by the Coast Guard under the bridge permitting process as providing for the reasonable needs of navigation for a particular location. Deviations from these Guide Clearances will be considered on a case-by-case basis during the bridge permitting process." (See Public Notice 18-96 in Appendix D).

The U.S. Coast Guard is a "Cooperating Agency" to this Draft Environmental Impact Statement. It is the U.S. Coast Guard's federal responsibility, as defined by the National Environmental Policy Act, to explore and bring forward all options in relation to the proposed project under the guidelines of this Act. The U.S. Coast Guard has not fulfilled their responsibility in regard to this law.

An interagency Memorandum from Joel Glenn of the Florida Department of Transportation to the "File" of the Compliance & Review Section of the Florida Department of Transportation dated April 11, 1996, states under 2.(c.) that "Alternative 1 is the alternative the Department has been developing to address rehabilitation. Upon review the waterway opening will not be approved by the U.S. Coast Guard" (See Appendix D).

U.S. Coast Guard Correspondence dated July 22, 1996, to U. S. Senator Bob Graham from John W. Lockwood, Rear Admiral, Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District, states: "My Bridge staff have met with State officials on several occasions to ensure that there is a full understanding of all presently known issues and concerns relevant to the States' preliminary bridge proposal. During our bridge permitting process, this particular bridge project will receive specific consideration for its historic standing under the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, and the implementing regulations at 36 CFR Part 800."

In the same Correspondence is the statement: "This unusual measure (in reference to "lay-up dolphins") is considered necessary to protect the bridge and navigation until bridge clearances can be established that will provide safe passage for waterborne commerce" (See Appendix D).

At this early point in the process, the U.S. Coast Guard stated the agency would comply with the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act, but in the same Correspondence to a U. S. Senator, the agency stated its intention to establish a wider horizontal clearance regardless of the provisions or process of this Act. Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard had already dictated a preordained, prescripted, and predetermined conclusion to the Florida Department of Transportation without giving consideration to options. The direct threat to invoke The Truman-Hobbs Act by the U.S. Coast Guard (see Winslow Correspondence; Exhibit J in the Draft) if the Florida Department of Transportation chooses Rehabilitation Alternative 1A is further evidence of an obdurate mindset. This predetermination by the U.S. Coast Guard coerced the process of the preparation of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement by the Florida Department of Transportation toward said conclusion.

The U.S. Coast Guard analysis and statements brought forward in the Draft, made in public forums, and released to the media relating to navigation and commercial traffic on the Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami, and "Passed the Point" of the Bridge of Lions are at best inept, and at worst choreographed subterfuge aimed at reaching a desired conclusion.

The selective, misrepresented, inaccurate, and misleading information, in relation to the data in the source documents of record, has deluded, manipulated, and polarized the St. Augustine community. A debate continues today in the community that is not grounded in the reality of what the source data brings forward. The U.S. Coast Guard, as a participating agency in the process of preparing this Draft Environmental Impact Statement, has poorly served the citizens of St. Augustine, and the American people. The consistent pattern, by the U.S. Coast Guard, of subverting this process violates the Public Trust.

A combination of prudent and feasible alternatives that address the horizontal clearance, local conditions, and navigational safety concerns while preserving the historical value of the Bridge does exist. Some of these solutions have been implemented with total success to date. The agencies involved in the "temporary solutions," the U.S. Coast Guard and the Florida Inland Navigational District (see Exhibit D in the Draft), refuse to explore or consider any prudent and feasible alternatives by simply stating this "is not considered by the Coast Guard to be an acceptable long term solution for transit through this reach of the Intracoastal Waterway." This position is arbitrary, capricious, and unyielding within the context of the issues that need to be resolved for this bridge project to move to fruition, and only slows down the process. This is a further dereliction of the responsibilities of the U.S. Coast Guard to the National Environmental Policy Act as a cooperating agency to the Draft.

Page 4-16, Paragraph 1 states "This is considered a temporary solution since it may have an adverse impact on a substantial number of small business entities." When researched case by case, the current "temporary solutions" in fact impact a small number of small business entities. Commercial traffic on this segment of the Intracoastal Waterway from Jacksonville to Miami, is currently in a trend of decline unrecognized by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Florida Inland Navigational District. In the overall view of commercial shipping concerns, this trend is expected to continue for a number of reasons relating to economics and laws that affect commercial shipping. The U.S. Coast Guard has forwarded an economic agenda favoring commercial shipping interests that does not exist as presented in the Draft. The benefits of this agenda are speculative and highly questionable.

In reference to the U.S. Coast Guard permitting process, Rehabilitation Alternative 1A does not change the "footprint" of the existing operating facility, nor does it change the existing navigational component of the Bridge of Lions. Therefore, a permit from the U.S. Coast Guard is probably not a requirement for the Florida Department of Transportation to implement this Alternative. If a permit is determined to be required for the Bridge, the permit process is inherently flexible to serve the historic, environmental, and economic Area of Potential Effects if rehabilitated within its footprint. The issuance of said permit cannot be prohibited.

If Alternative 1B, 2A, or 2B is chosen as the preferred option, a "Record of Decision" cannot be filed based on this Draft Environmental Impact Statement. The Draft has not addressed the prospective impacts of widening the horizontal clearance. Widening this horizontal clearance encourages more barge traffic, larger barges, and increased capacity of cargo tonnages through this point of the Intracoastal Waterway. The possible adverse effects on the environmental quality of the Waterway and surrounding ecosystems must be considered. Additionally, simply widening the horizontal clearance of the Bridge does not address or solve complex "local conditions" as they interact with the Bridge or the channel and the relationship to safety. A new and separate Environmental Impact Statement will be necessary under the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act to further address and pursue these Alternatives.

In conclusion, in its present manifestation, this Draft Environmental Impact Statement is fatally flawed. Many corrections and additions need to be made to this document to bring forward an accurate perception of the issues as they relate to the Alternatives. These corrections and additions should include all the commercial shipping data available including an accurate and unbiased analysis of this data. Safety concerns of navigation for all four current Options brought forward in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement have not been explored to seek prudent or feasible alternatives. The social and economic impacts as they relate to the Area of Potential Effects have not been considered.

The benefits of undertaking a Replacement Option, with the information available, do not justify the acceptance of the loss of this Historic National Landmark. Recognizing the historic nature of this facility, every measure of consideration should be given to preserving the Bridge of Lions in its existing location.

T.J. Tremmel

St. Augustine, Florida

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D